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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
FRANK H. FULLMER, 
Plaintiff-respondent, 
vs. 
PARLEY J. BAKER, 
Defendant-appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATUUE OF CASE 
Case No. 
12969 
This is an action to recover the purchase price for 
failure to deliver shares of stock which were to be de-
livered "within one year" from the date of the agree-
ment of purchase. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY J_.OWER COURT 
The lower Court granted judgment for $5,000.00 
which was the purchase price for the shares of stock. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The judgment for $5,000.00 should be reversed and 
judgment entered ordering delivery of the shares or 
2 
the case should he remanded to determine the valur 
the shares not delivered. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about l\J arch 15, 1970, the Plaint 
FRANK l<'ULLl\IER (FULLl\IER), and the! 
fendant, PARLEY UAKEit (BAKER), execut 
a written agreement ( R. 9) under which FULL~l! 
agree<l to pay ~5,000.00 for 20,000 shares of stocl 
l.F.C., a Utah corporation. The $5,000.00 was pain 
BAKER by check ma<le payable to l.F.C. Thefo 
were paid directly to the corporation (R. 72). Theagrr 
ment provided that the shares were to be delirn 
"within one year from the date" of the agreement"fr 
from all encumbrances." llowever, time was not m< 
the essence of the agreement, and there was no evidet 
that FULLl\IER needed or wanted the shares bya: 
particular date. The agreement was not a loan of ~i.11 
but a purchase of the 20,000 shares for $5,000.00 [l 
75). 
FULLMER testified that he asked for [. 
shares soon after the agreement was signed (R. ~· 
awl that he knew the shares were owned personallr 
BAKER (R. 69). However, FULLMER mader 
further request or demand for the shares during l 
entire year of the agreement although the shares we 
available to him at any time (R. 92-93). BAKER~ 
. d . h . ment and !O forgotten the date stipulate mt e agieeh h !Jis: 
after that date passed FULLMER, t roug · 
3 
tornev, demanded a refund of the $5,000.00. Upon re-
ceivir;g the demand, BAKER immediately contacted 
FULLMER and tendered the shares to him, but 
FULLMER refused them. This action was then com-
menced and BAKER renewed his tender of the shares 
in his answer. 
ARGU:MENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT'S T E N D E R OF THE 
SHARES TO PLAINTIFF AFTER THE YEAR 
EXPIRED PREVENTS ACTION FOR 
BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT SINCE 
TIME \VAS NOT THE ESSENCE OF THE 
AGREEl\IENT. 
FULLl\1"ER'S testimony indicated that he made 
only one request for delivery of the shares to him and 
that was soon after the agreement was signed and long 
before delivery of the shares was due under the agree-
ment. He made no other requests or demands for the 
shares and apparently decided to let one year pass, hop-
ing that BAKER would forget the date on which de-
livery was due. He then made demand for return of his 
money and ref used to accept the shares which had been 
available to him at any time during or after the year. 
Although there is no showing in this case as to the 
value of the shares, either when purchased or at the 
end of the year, it is obvious that the reason for FULL-
IVIER'S position is that the shares had decreased in 
value. It is also obYious that had the shar · 
. ' ' es lllcrea1, 
m. value, FULLl\IER would have demanded delir;r 
of the shares eyen after the vear ex1)ired H h : 
.J • e as a,, 
rnitted that the purpose of the agreement wa t · 
• s o pu: 
chase the shares from llA KER under whi.ch h 1 ' e ll'OU:. 
be taking the risk of increase or decrease in valueau' 
ing the year. Now he wants to back out of whatwa 
apparently a bad bargain and place the risk of thatk 
gain on B1\..KER. . 
BAKER'S failure to deliver the shares withinlfr 
year was inadvertent. The shares were a\'ailable forur 
liYery at any time and upon being reminded of theool 
gation he immediately tendered the shares. Wht 
FULLl\lER refused the tender, a formal tenderwa1 
made of the shares through IlAKER'S attorney. Agai: 
FULLl\lER refused and commenced this action. 
The agreement did not provide that time was it' 
essence of the agreement nor does the evidence shoi 
any compelling reason why the shares had to beat 
livered on .l\Iarch 15, 1H71. FULLMER did notshoi 
that the date of delivery macle any difference to himo: 
that the failure to deliver ou March 15, 1971, cau)ll 
any damage to him. The law is clear that time is nG: 
the essence of an agreement unless the agreement ti· 
d l · f tl · reement 11' pressly so states an t le natme o le ag 
· 1· · k f ..-nance on I~ SUITOUIH mg circumstances ma es per 01 ... 
stipulated date a necessary term of the agreement.'\ 
· 1· · h I d this quesbo'. series of cases m l\ issouri ave exp ore d 
thoroughly and so determined. In Tamko Asphalt Pr' 
5 
ucfs, Inc. t'. /l'cni.r, 321. S.,V. 2d 527 (l\fo. 1958), the 
agreement contained a ''time being of the essence" 
clause and yet the court found that the parties did not 
so intend because other provisions of the agreement 
demonstrated a contrary intent. That case relied upon 
the earlier cases of Eric City Iron Worlcs v. Ferer, 282 
S.\V. 470 (l\Io. 1926) and Ottumwa Bridge Co. v. Cor-
rigan, 251 l\Io. 667, 1.58 S.vV. 39. The Erie case held 
that a contract for delivery of a boiler on a specific date 
was not breached by delivery after that date so as to 
justify repndia tion an<l refusal to take delivery since 
time was not made and did not appear to be of the es-
sence. The refusal to take delivery was due to the avail-
ability of a better price elsewhere. The case of Lane v. 
N111111, 243 S.vV. 427, 211 Mo. App. 280 (1922) held 
that in an agreement to repurchase shares of stock "at 
the expiration of one year," time was not of the es-
sence, and the defendant was required to repurchase 
the shares even though the request to repurchase was 
not made until one month after the end of the year. The 
court stated: 
"'Vhere a contract has been mutually and 
fairly entered into by both parties and time is 
not expressly made the essence of the contract 
and neither party has expressly repudiated it 
(in this ease plaintiff notified defendant she 
wanted him to take the stock), one party can-
not evade its obligations on the ground of de-
lay of the other, unless he shows damage to 
himself by such delay, or such an unreasonable 
6 
or intentional and willful delau as w1"Jl · ·' evince 
an intention on the part of the delaying party 
to treat the contract as at an end." 
The Ottumwa Bridge case, supra, quoted~ 
adopted the opinion of the federal court in Beck&Pa: 
Lith, Co. v. Colorado IJlilling & Elevator Co., 52Fi 
700 (8th Cir.) as follows: 
"It is a general principle governing the 
construction of contracts that stipulations as 
to the time of their performance are not neces· 
sarily of the essence, unless it clearly appears 
in the given case from the express stipulations 
of the contract or the nature of its subject 
matter that the parties intended performance 
within the time fixed in the contract to be a 
condition precedent to its enforcement, and, 
where the intention of the parties does not so 
appear, performance shortly after the time 
limited on the part of either party will not 
justify a refusal to perform by the party ag· 
O'rieved but his only remedv will be an action 
b ' • .I 
or counterclaim for the damages he has sus· 
tained from the breach of the stipulation. 
"This contract shows no intention on the 
· for 
Part of either party to make the date given · · the the completion of the work of its essence, IIl 
sense ihat an action may not be brought upon 
7 
it for recovery of the contract price upon com-
pletion and acceptance at a later date; and 
the law will not presume such an intention 
unless there is something in the nature of the 
work that makes the completion at that time 
an element in its permanent value, or the date 
serves a temporary purpose that is an im-
portant inducement to the undertaking." 
FULLl\lER'S failure to show any damages re-
sulting from delay or that the delay was unreasonable 
or willful so as to indicate an intention not to perform 
or that there was any reason why he had to have per-
formance ou the date stipulated prevents recovery in an 
action for breach. A case which is very similar to the 
case now before the court is Vorwerk v. Nolte, 87 Cal. 
2:rn, 2;j Pac. 1112. In that case an agreement for the 
purchase of lawl provided that "time is of the essence 
of this contract" and that the seller would return the 
pmd1ase price if he failed to execute and deliver a con-
veyance of the property "after one year from the date 
hereof." The court held that the time for conveyance, 
though stipulated, was not the essence of the contract. 
Those words applied only to the obligation to pay the 
purchase price which had already been paid. Therefore, 
tender of conveyance after the time stipulated prevented 
the buyer from obtaining a refund. Of course, the agree-
ment now before this court did not provide that time 
was the essence nor did it provide for return of the pur-
chase price if the shares were not delivered when agreed. 
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Consequently, this case is even stronger than Voru 
and the tender of i)erformance here should als · . o~ 
the buyer from obtaining a refund. · 
II. 
EVEN ASSUMING THE AGREEME:i "r AS BREACHED FOR 'FAILURE TO n, 
I,IY"E.R THE SHARES BY THE AGREl 
DATE, PLAINTIFF'S REMEDY IS NOH 
FUND BUT DAMAGES CAUSED BY TR 
UREACH. P L A I N T I F F SHOULD i 
PLACED IN THE POSITION HE won 
IIA YE OCCUPIED HAD THE AGREE~!E! 
IlEEN PERFOR~lED. 
It has already been mentioned that FULU!I 
sought the best of both worlds by asking for refunn 
his money when his bargain was found to be a poor!' 
He would obviously have demanded delivery oil 
shares had their value increased while he sat sileK 
by'. The law bas always attempted to compensare 
'~ronged party by placing him in the position he WOl 
have occupied had his agreement been fully perforrrt . 
. . f d'22t The aeneral law on this subJect is oun m · 
0 
Jur. 2d Damages §§ 12 and 13: 
§ 12. Compensation as the general rule or 
objective 
Compensation is the stated goal of courts 
· · · y or for in awarding damages for tort1ous UlJUf 
9 
breach of a contractual promise. . . . With 
contracts, compensation is most often stated in 
terms of placing the plaintiff in the same fi-
nancial position in which he would have been 
had the promise not been broken. 
§ i:J. Compensation as limit of recovery. 
. . The law will not put (the damaged 
party) in a better position than he would be in 
had the wrong not been done or the contract 
not been broken." 
Contrary to these propositions, the lower court 
has placed FULLl\IER in a better position than he 
would haYe occupied had the agreement been performed 
to the letter. The agreement was a purchase of shares 
to be deli\·erecl in the future. BAKER tendered deliv-
ry shortly after the stipulated date. Had the shares not 
heen tendered, FULL.MER could have sued for spe-
cific performance or for the value of the shares. How-
er er, since the shares were tenderd, :FULLMER'S 
remedy was for damages caused by the delay-which 
he failed to show in this case. To quote again from the 
Beck & Pauli case, supra at 702: 
" ... performance shortly after the time 
limited on the part of either party will not 
justify a refusal to perform by the party ag-
grieved, but his only remedy will be an action 
or counterclaim for the damages he has sus-
tained from the breach of the stipulation." 
10 
}_,,ULLl\IER did not seek, nor did he h , 
S 011 I 
dama?es .for delay or breach, and the court er~d 
entermg Judgment for refund of the purchase · 
pn~1 
III. 
THE FACT THAT THE SHARES Pt: 
CHASED BY PLAINTIFF '\7ERE NOT REi 
ISTERED WITH THE UTAH SECURITII 
COl\ll\lISSION OR THE SECURITIES AJ1 
EXCHANGE COl\I:MISSION DOES NOTCOJ 
STITUTE AN "ENCUl\lBRANCE" UPON TR 
SHARES. 
Although the lower court did not expressly son~] 
it is apparent that it considered the shares to bet 
cumbered by the fact that they were not registered!! 
sale to the public with the Utah Securities Commi~i 
or the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thisstei 
from the agreement which states that the shares"~ 
now, and will at all times during the period of It 
agreement be, free from all encumbrances." It snol 
be obvious that if the shares were not registered at~ 
time the agreement was signed, there was no reqwr 
ment that thev be registered at the time of delin~ 
Otherwise, the. "are now" and "will ... be" clauseL 
no meaning. The shares when tendered were in exar: 
h d N " umbranl\ the same status as when pure ase . o enc 
intervened. The argument that FULLMER couldr 
" · b d " · t relevant wri: resell the shares to JUSt any o y is no r 
considered in the light of the fact that the agretDl 
11 
does not require or contemplate resale of the shares by 
FULLMER. Furthermore, the shares could have been 
leaally resold by FU LLMEH, under the securities 
ti • 
laws, in the same kind of isolated (non-public) trans-
action in which he purchased the shares from BAKER. 
The word "encumbrance" is usually applied to 
real property and is "any right to or interest in land 
which may subsist in third persons to the diminution of 
the value of the interest or estate of the landowner but 
which does not conflict with his conveyance of the fee." 
Hebb v. Severson, 32 \\!ash. 2d 159, 201 P. 2d 156, at 
mo; Tahoe National Rank v. Phillips, 92 Cal. Rptr. 
704', 712, 480 P.2d 320. This commonly understood defi-
nition relates to interests which "third parties" might 
holll against the property and includes mortgages, taxes 
arnl assessments. The same definition can apply to per-
sonal property. In contrast, it is also understood that 
restrictive ordinances or other governmental statutes 
or regulations, which are imposed on land or its use or 
transfer pursuant to police power, are not encumbrances 
within a covenant against encumbrances. Hall v. Risley, 
188 Or. 69, 213 P.2d 818, 826; Fritts v. Oerul.:os, 273 
~ N.C. 116, 159 S.E. 2d 536, 539; see also Lohmeyer v. 
Bower, 170 Kan. 442, 227 P.2d 102; Rincon Band of 
Indians v. San Diego County, 324 F. Supp. 371, 377 
r: (D.C. Cal.) ; JVilson v. Calvert, 96 F. Supp. 597, 601 
( D.C. Ariz.). These cases cover restrictions on land 
pursuant to ordinances regulating its use, the location 
,·rr or character of buildings permitted thereon, reservations 
nr of mineral rights, as well as restrictions on transfer. 
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Again the same principles applv to personal 
• • .1 • proper\' 
Any restrictions on the sale or transfer of I · s iares 11; 
stock pursuant to governmental statute or re u] 1. · g a 01, 
such as registration with the Utah Securities C " 
• Olli!llli 
s1on or the Securities and Exchange Commission riv 
to "public distribution," is therefore not an en~ 
brance, and the lower court was in error to so find Xi 
liens, mortgages, taxes or assessments and no other~ 
terests of "third parties" were shown to exist agailli 
the shares tendered to FULLMER, and therefore fi 
encumbrances existed to justify refusal of the tender. 
CONCLUSION 
Although a specific date for performance wmtl 
forth in the agreement, time was not made the essenCT 
of the agreement. .F'ULI .~I ER did not show a111 
reason why performance was vital or necessary on tnt 
specified date. In fact, if performance on that datena1l 
been necessary, he need only have notified BAKER 
and he could have had the shares. Instead, he waitro 
silently until the date had passed and then demanaro· 
a ref nnd without asking for the shares or gi11ni 
BAKER a chance to deliver them. BAKER'S tenner 
of the shares upon being reminded of his obligation 
d t an ac amounts to complete performance an preven s 
• !'!Ill 
tion for breach. The lower court was therefore me , 
· · dgroen1 
to find a breach of the agreement and to give JU 
for the purchase price. 
13 
rt: Should the court determine that the agreement 
was breached for failure to perform on the agreed date, 
r,: FULLl\IER'S remedy is the damages caused by the 
~ delay or failure to perform on that date. The judgment 
rendered in this case was in no way related to any Joss 
caused to F ULLl\lER by the failure to perform on a 
date certain. In fact, no damages were even shown. The 
pnrpose of the law in awarding damages is to place the 
injmed party in the same position he would have occu-
pied had there been no breach. Delivery of the shares 
nr a judgment for their value on the agreed delivery 
date would have fully compensated FULLMER. The 
judgment entered below places FULLMER in a bet-
ter position than full and timely performance of the 
agreement would haYe done, and it should therefore be 
rerersed. 
Finally, the word "encumbrance" as used in the 
agreement was not shown to have any meaning different 
from that commonly understood in connection with real 
property. Encumbrance refers to such things as mort-
gages, taxes and assessments held by or due to third 
parties hut does not in any way relate to governmental 
restrietions upon the use or transfer of property. These 
things are matters of Jaw and are presumed to be known 
by all persons who deal in the property. Lack of reg-
istration of the shares for public distribution is not an 
encurnbrance and does not prevent the resale of the 
shares in the same kind of private transaction by which 
FULLMER purchased the shares. The lower court's 
14' 
determination that the shares were not free from, 
cumbrances should therefore be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLAR 
Ralph J. Marsh 
